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Analysis of the determinants of Temporary employment in 19 
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Frédéric Salladaré (Univ of Rennes) &  
Stéphane Hlaimi (Univ of Manchester) 
Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of temporary employment in 19 European. We show 
temporary employees work less than permanent workers with reference to working time, 
which reduces relatively their potential wages. Moreover, the probability of holding a fixed 
term contract is negatively correlated with trade-union membership and non-permanent 
workers are more sensitive to the need of strong trade-unions. From another hand, past 
unemployment is likely to reduce the likelihood of permanent job. 
Finally, comparing part-time and temporary employment, we put forward some points of 
convergence: both work arrangement are more feminized, less syndicated, more involved in 
small establishments and have less hierarchical responsibilities. Nonetheless, part-time 
employment is more feminized than fixed-term contract. Age acts in the same sense, but 
fixed-term workers are younger than part-timers.  
JEL Classification: J64, E32, C41; J41; J60 
Key Words: temporary jobs, fixed term contract, permanent job, part-time  
 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
 For more than two decades, temporary employment has shown an extensive development in 
the majority of OECD countries. On average, in the European economies, the part of fixed 
term contracts (henceforth FTC) grew from 5.5% in 1983, to 14% in 2005 (OECD, 2007). 
FTC, interim, on-call contracts and other work arrangements was created and developed. 
Several reforms led to an increase in the use of those contracts generating lower firing costs 
(Belot et al, 2002). The utilisation of new work arrangements aims to increase the labour 
market flexibility, reduce unemployment and to allow for an adjustment to an unexpected or 
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limited demand (Blank and Freeman, 1994). However, this can increase employment 
instability and reduce job security. Moreover, the growth of temporary employment generates 
a differentiating and unequal dynamics regarding employment characterized for many 
specialists by a “strong economic vulnerability and a potential restriction of social rights 
since the latter are founded, mainly, on the employment stability” (Paugam, 2000). Several 
approaches provided number of explanations of the development of FTC. Other studies based 
on micro data tried to identify the determinants of temporary employment. FTC can combine 
several specificities. In several countries, temporary jobs appear, on average, less qualified, 
less remunerated and less syndicated. This work arrangement often involves young people 
and women. However, a limited number of studies focused on international comparisons 
regarding this form of employment. 
Basing on an international sample, our paper tries to compare the determinants of temporary 
employment in several European countries. We seek to show both similarities and differences 
in the determinants of FTC. Moreover, following a cumulative principle, we focus on 
differences related to work conditions and especially the connection between part time and 
fixed term employment. 
This paper will be organized as follow: In the first section, we provide a review of literature 
on the determinants of temporary employment. In the second section, we present the data and 
the variables used in our empirical analysis. The third section is devoted to empirical results 
while the fifth concludes. 
 
1. REVIEW OF LITERATURE: 
Theoretical analysis apprehends temporary employment, either as a contractual form offering 
a method of adjustment regarding the fluctuations of activity, or as the outcome of dual labour 
markets. Some recent approaches stress the importance of FTC in the process of recruitment 
through permanent jobs.  
At the same time, temporary employment is a way of entry into the labour market and a mode 
of adjustment for the employers, in a context of imperfect information, to determine workers‟ 
productivities. If this assumption on the selection process is fully confirmed, the relevance of 
long-term measurements on job security would be reduced. A non-permanent employment 
could appear as a period of specific training or integration within the firm. In this context, it 
should be perceived in a positive way by the majority of workers: FTC can be the first form of 
securitisation of employment tracks. Moreover, the necessity to combine this form of 
flexibility and job security would be reduced.  
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However, the assumption of a non-standard employment as a mode of pre-recruitment is 
partially validated. For a majority of temporary workers, limited duration employment is not 
considered as a mode of extending the probation period, and thus it can be associated with 
various forms of flexibility. 
 
1.1. Temporary employment: traditional approaches and assumption of stepping stones  
A limited number of theoretical approaches consider employment contracts according to their 
duration. The first approach developed by Gray (1978) endogenized the contract duration. 
The author analysed the use to intermediate work arrangements between permanent and spot 
contracts (Simon, 1951). Reconsidering Walras labour market framework, Simon (1951) 
defined the employment relation as a durable arrangement held between the employer and the 
employee. However, for spot contracts, the two parties choose to limit the relation to a fixed 
period. The terms of the contract are predetermined in the case of a FTC, even if it does not 
appear in this approach. Several analyses have dealt with limited duration employment.  
Doeringer and Piore (1971) define internal labour market as an administrative unit in which 
pricing and labour allocation such as recruitments, mobility or earnings are driven by a set of 
organizational rules. Such rules are more or less formalized, specific to each firm, 
disconnected from the labour market and defining long-term employment. In this approach, 
employees look for job stability and firms tend to set their internal market by limiting the cost 
of job rotation, taking into account the external market to give them the required degree of 
flexibility. In opposition to this process of assignment and compensation, on the external 
labour market, earnings, training and time allocation depend on supply and demand 
adjustments. The use of FTC is a component of this secondary market that appears relatively 
hermetic. Accordingly, Piore and Doeringer (1971) propose an analytical framework of labour 
market segmentation even if this does not allow for explaining the assumption of FTC as 
stepping stones. 
For Gray (1978), temporary employment enables to adapt to demand fluctuations. Within an 
uncertain environment, the contract length is the result of a trade-off between transaction-
costs and hiring costs. While the employer defines the duration, the extension of labour 
contracts makes it possible to amortize hiring and firing costs as well as specific training. In 
the model developed by Canzoneri (1980), trade unions establish both contract length and 
wages, whereas firms choose their employment levels. Also an increasing uncertainty 
enhances hiring and firing costs which reduce the contract duration. However, after the two 
oil crises, the contract durations remained relatively stable (Danziger, 1992). Moreover, 
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basing on the implicit contracts theory Danziger (1992) shows that the length of temporary 
contracts is the outcome of risk sharing between employers and employees. According to the 
nature of shocks (real, nominal or relative), the contract duration is not uniformly affected. 
Furthermore, the extent of shocks seems to affect the contract length (Danziger, 1996). 
However, only the hiring costs and the intensity of the shocks and their variability can explain 
the choice of FTC, whereas workers‟ characteristics have no effect, which seems to be 
contradicted by the empirical studies. Like Piore and Doeringer (1971), these models cannot 
explain the assumption of temporary contracts as a stepping stone towards permanent jobs. 
Several complementary approaches integrate the assumption of stepping stones. In a context 
of imperfect information regarding the effort level and the capacities to produce, the employer 
has limited information on the employees. The relation of interdependence between work 
arrangements is likely to induce a situation of adverse-selection (Lazear, 1995). This 
encourages employees to reveal their work productivity in the hope of recruitment on a 
permanent contract. For Harris and Holmström (1987), the labour contract duration allows the 
employer to adjust in a context of imperfect information, taking into account variations of 
workers‟ productivities. This model shows that the contract duration is established according 
to the number of periods required to reach the compulsory level of productivity. The more the 
interval is tightened, the more the contract duration lengthens. However, the deadline cannot 
be set by the employer because he has to observe beforehand the employees‟ productivities. 
Accordingly, Guriev and Kvasov (2005) introduce costs linked to the breach of the contract 
and to the renegotiation. In this model, a distinction is made between the contract length and 
the duration of agreement between the contracting parts. The contractual duration enables to 
integrate information on the specific investment carried out by the contracting parties and on 
the evolution of external options. However, the contract length is given ex post in this model. 
 
1.2- Temporary employment: a stepping stone towards permanent job?  
Over the last two decades, more than one third of European workers are recruited through 
non-permanent work arrangement, of which the half on FTC (OECD, 2002). Non-standard 
employment aims to adjust demand fluctuations and their unpredictable nature such as illness 
or absenteeism, to reduce labour costs or to find workers with rare or specific competences 
needed for a short period or for specific projects (Everaere, 1999). Certain approaches  
analyzed the implications of FTC from several perspectives. On the one hand, non-permanent 
employment can be considered as a method of entry on the labour market (Engellandt and 
Riphahn, 2005). On the other hand, two advanced assumptions are opposed: that of a 
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temporary activity like job shopping and that of stepping stones towards permanent jobs (job 
shopping versus stepping stone).  
In the first case, FTC can be deliberately chosen. In several countries, certain temporary work 
arrangements offer particular advantages in terms of remuneration or trade-off between work 
and leisure. This effect of selected flexibility can result from a bargaining power favourable to 
workers according to their characteristics. In the second case, non-standard employment 
enables employers to filter the upcoming permanent employees. This work arrangement can 
be used at labour market entry as a selection process or of stepping stones. Empirically, the 
assumption of FTC as a stepping stone to permanent jobs was the subject of several studies.  
For the United Kingdom, Booth et al (2002) partially confirmed the assumption of stepping 
stones, followed by an increase in wages and welfare benefits. Over a 7 years period, 
approximately 38% of non-standard workers go towards permanent jobs after the term of their 
temporary contract. This positive inciting effect of FTC does not characterize all the types of 
non-standard work arrangements. Temporary employment by its nature (i.e. seasonal workers) 
is distinguished from the non-temporary activities. There are strong differences in the 
transitions in term of wages and satisfaction. The authors underlined the importance of local 
conditions of employment (in particular unemployment/vacancy ratio). With a duration 
model, Güell and Petrongolo (2007) analyze the determinants of the conversion of temporary 
contracts into permanent jobs in Spain. The conversion rates are generally lower than 10%: 
the rate grows with the contract duration with a pick at the legal bound of the contract when it 
is not possible to retain the worker on a temporary job. The differences in conversion between 
the categories of workers rise from differences in exit options. Nevertheless, the rates of 
transition from FTC towards permanents jobs appear relatively weak in Spain (Amuedo-
Dorante, 2000). The conversion rates are weaker for less qualified workers and grow with 
seniority, while men have higher conversion rates (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). Güell and 
Petrongolo (2007) distinguish between entry into and exit from temporary jobs: in the Spanish 
case, the probability of accession to permanent job is higher for those on temporary work 
arrangements than for the unemployed (for the US case, see Farber, 1999). Güell and 
Petrongolo (2007) find that the conversion rates of temporary contracts into permanent jobs 
increase with age. 
For Italy, the transition probability from a FTC to a permanent job increases with the contract 
duration, but decreases with repeated temporary employments, in particular with job 
interruptions (Gagliarducci, 2005). Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that it is not 
temporary employment itself, but the intermittency which is detrimental to employment. For a 
6 
 
long temporary contract the probability of conversion first increases and decreases thereafter. 
Van Ours (2004) analyzes the locking-in effects of subsidized temporary jobs using a natural 
experiment of the Slovak labour market. He shows that if subsidized employment holds for 
long time, workers reduce the intensity of their job search. Hagen (2003) and Hagen and 
Boockmann (2005) confirmed the assumption of partial probationary period for Germany. For 
Switzerland, Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) found that 26% of non-standard wage-earners 
sign in temporary jobs after the end of their contract. 
In France, temporary contracts became for many firms the usual method of recruitment. They 
represent the privileged instrument of short-term adjustment but also of the conversion of 
unstable jobs into unstable careers (Goux, 2000). In France, the length of temporary jobs 
positively affects the matching probability on the labour market when this one is not 
interrupted by inactivity or a layoff (Bunel, 2007). The rates of access to stable employment 
are less different according to the age than the diploma. For CERC (2005), France is 
distinguished within the European countries, by weak transitions from the temporary contracts 
towards permanent work arrangements. Within the French labour market, 25% of workers 
who were in temporary jobs in 1999 are in permanent posts one year later. For the EU 
countries, only Spain (25%) and Portugal (10%) have lower rates of transition. However, the 
rates of transition are about 55% in Austria, in Ireland and in the Netherlands; and 50% in 
Belgium and 45% in the United Kingdom (CERC, 2005).  
France can be ranked among a group of countries, with Spain, Finland, Portugal, Greece and 
Italy, where the access to FTC are rarely a stepping stone towards permanent jobs. On the 
short run, the persistence in temporary employment is thus strong in Portugal, France and 
Spain. The southern European countries show high levels of temporary employment and offer 
less transition towards permanent jobs than northern European countries (Muffels and Luijkx, 
2005). On the long term, the position of France becomes more favourable: nearly 60% of 
workers, who were in temporary contract in 1995, had a permanent job in 2000. This part 
remains lower than 50% for Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece (European Commission, 2003). 
Nevertheless, in France as in Spain or Finland, the risk of unemployment, five years after 
having occupied a temporary employment appears relatively high.  
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Figure 1 Evolution of fixed-term contracts in Europe
between 1985 and 2005
(in % of paid employment)
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Temporary employment is a pattern of entry into the labour market. However, the assumption 
of a non-standard employment as stepping stones is partially confirmed. It depends on the 
national settings. Accordingly, the implementation of measures towards more job security 
seems required.  
In what follows, the relationship between temporary employment and sociodemographic 
determinants as well as work conditions will be analyzed. We will also compare two forms of 
atypical employment in order to understand both specificities and differences of each work 
arrangement.    
 
2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 
2.1. The European Social Survey: 
The data used in this study are from the first wave of the European Social Survey (henceforth 
ESS). The sample counts 42.359 individuals from 19 countries1. This wave provides more 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal Sweden and Slovenia 
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than 500 questions regarding employment, work conditions, and socio-demographic 
characteristics of individuals and their households. Several questions refer to the labour 
market activity. In addition, the ESS provides information on individual behaviours and 
beliefs in the European countries. The sample includes active wage-earners of more than 15 
years old. This leaves us with 37964 observations. In the ESS, individuals are questioned on 
the nature of their employment contract (FTC or not). Among the wage-earners, a binary 
variable is defined to give us information about the temporary work. We use a set of probit 
models in order to establish the explanatory factors of temporary employment. The 
endogenous variable is “holding a FTC” in opposition to “holding a permanent job” 
considered as situation of reference. The explanatory variables are related to individual and 
family characteristics of wage-earners.  
Basing on this international sample, the determinants of fixed term employment will be 
analyzed. This will allow us to capture similarities and differences in temporary employment 
between European countries.  
Given the qualitative nature of our endogenous variable, the traditional methods of inferences 
based on linear specifications cannot be adopted. Models with qualitative variables enable in 
this case to take into account discontinuity of the dependant variables. The explanatory factors 
selected are the followings: gender, age, the household size, the marital status (with 4 
modalities), the size of sibship (with 4 modalities), the level of education (with 4 modalities), 
the socioeconomic status (basing on the general Nomenclature of the Economic activities in 
the European Communities) and the geographic location (with 4 modalities), the citizenship, 
additional working time, the unemployment period, the trade-union membership, hierarchical 
responsibilities, the establishment size and the extent of work organization 
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics: 
Table 1 suggests that gender differences in employment status are more unfavourable to 
female workforce. While gender differences in permanent employment is about 2 points, FTC 
are more feminized with 6 points higher for women. Being immigrant doesn‟t affect 
considerably the employment status where almost 4.4% of immigrants hold permanent jobs 
and 5% work on temporary work arrangement. 
Regarding age, older workers are less affected by temporary employment. However, the rate 
of young employees in FTC exceeds 25%. In addition, temporary jobs are often held by single 
workers and individuals without children, whereas approximately 60% of married workers are 
in permanent positions. 
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For geographic location, the shares of the two work arrangements are very similar even if 
higher rates of employment are observed in rural areas. For educational dummies, secondary 
education is the most employable for both permanent and temporary employments. Finally, 
for work conditions, temporary employment is less involved in trade union membership and 
temporary workers are more likely to appreciate the presence of strong trade-unions.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: 
3.1. Sociodemographic determinants of temporary employment:  
Table 2 summarises the analysis of socio-demographic determinants of FTC in 19 European 
countries. In the whole sample, temporary employment is more feminized. Women are more 
involved in the idea of flexibility. In France, men are more often in temporary and casual jobs 
while women are more likely to hold FTC (Brunet, 2003). This result is confirmed at the 
European level (Stener Pedersen et al, 2004). In France, the probability of holding permanent 
job after an episode of temporary employment is relatively lower for women (Bunel, 2007). 
Gender difference in temporary employment can arise from a female specific behaviour. 
Women are more likely to work on temporary arrangements: this tendency can result from the 
high propensity of women within public and tertiary sectors (Booth et al, 2002; Lazear and 
Rosen, 1990).   
Another explanation can be associated with the types of “female jobs”. The economic sectors 
with the important shares of female workers are those where non-permanent employment is 
the most common. This structural effect can explain gender differences. Nevertheless, the 
importance of the national context should be put forward. The gender control is significant 
only in a half of the countries studied. For all the southern countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal 
and Greece) and in almost all northern economies (Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Finland, 
except for Denmark), temporary employment appears more feminized (see table 2a).   
Moreover, temporary employment is inversely correlated with age: the profile of this last 
control takes an inverted U-shaped. However, the minimum is around 66 years. Such a work 
arrangement also involve the youth (Gasparini et al. 2000). This result partially supports the 
assumption of temporary employment as stepping stones to permanent jobs. Furthermore, the 
marital status negatively affects the probability of holding a FTC while the household size 
increases it. The marriage is a protection from temporary work in southern and continental 
European countries (Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy, and Portugal except for 
Belgium, Spain and Greece). For France, our results confirm an association between fixed 
term employment and celibacy (Cottrell et al, 2002). Alternatively, the presence of children is 
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conversely connected with the probability of holding a FTC.  A permanent job can be a factor 
supporting the choice to have one or more children. Accordingly, the presence of one child 
can be perceived like a signal favourable to a more stable work arrangement for an employer. 
Education is appears a key factor for the probability of holding a FTC: in particular, low 
levels of education positively affect the likelihood of holding a temporary job. This result is 
relevant for all European countries (Pedersen et al, 2004).  
Ceteris Paribus, the probability of holding a FTC is reduced, from approximately 45% for 
primary education compared to the absence of diploma, from 67% with a secondary level and 
from 63% with tertiary level. The educational level is generally lower for non-permanent 
workers, even if this depends on the flexible forms of work: temporary workers tend to be less 
qualified whereas the majority of the on-call and permanent workers have more training 
levels. For France, we do not find a significant effect of education. Nevertheless, permanent 
part-timers are more educated and more qualified than workers holding FTC (Cottrell et al, 
2002). However, little difference is observed for the United Kingdom between the two last 
work arrangements, although on average temporary employment is less qualified (Booth et al, 
2002). A tertiary level of education increases the probability of holding a permanent job. This 
effect is confirmed for Germany, Finland and Sweden. In these countries, temporary 
employment is often devoted to workers with rare or particular skills required for a short 
period or specific projects.  
For the economic activities, the ESS utilizes the general Nomenclature of the Economic 
activities in the European Communities (NACE). Temporary employment is positively 
associated with agriculture, hunting and fishing, reflecting a rather seasonal employment. The 
probability of holding a FTC increases for tertiary sector. In Europe, temporary employment 
is relatively frequent in service sector, food industries and construction (Stener Pedersen et al, 
2004). Conversely, the probability of holding a non-permanent job is lower in manufacturing 
industries, transport and communications, financial intermediation.  
The analysis confirms for several countries (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden) the positive effect of agriculture on the probability of 
holding a FTC. Construction dummy is positively correlated with non-permanent employment 
in particular for Spain (confirming the results of Dolado et al, 2002; Gagliarducci, 2005), 
whereas Italy is characterized by a strong tendency to this work arrangement for the hotel and 
restaurant sector. Globally, in spite of a growing development in a variety of sectors, 
temporary jobs are particularly spread in services sector. 
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Finally, temporary employment is concentrated in big cities. While living in rural regions 
reduce the probability of holding FTC. The presence in urban areas has a positive impact on 
the probability to work temporarily only for women. One explanation could arise from 
sectoral differences. If the density of population is high, the possibility of finding a permanent 
job is likely to decrease. 
 
3.2. Work conditions of temporary employees: 
Table 3 informs about the characteristics of workers on FTC regarding their working 
conditions and their professional tracks. Temporary employees seem to work less than 
permanent workers with reference to working time, which reduced relatively their potential 
wages. Among full-time workforce, temporary employees make less overtime work in France 
(Cottrell et al, 2002). For Switzerland, temporary workers provide higher effort than 
permanent employees: their probability of unpaid overtime work exceeds that of permanent 
workers by 60%, characterizing an effort to integrate an established post (Engellandt and 
Riphahn, 2005).  
Temporary employees are more likely to work in part-time2. In France, non-permanent 
workers seem to work less than those holding permanent jobs (Cottrell et al, 2002): the 
temporary part-time jobs is particularly spread among young and single women. This seems 
similar for the European level (Daubas-Letourneux, 1998). A part-time activity generally 
offers a weak level of earning. 
Moreover, the probability of holding a FTC is negatively correlated with trade-union 
membership. All things being equal, being syndicated reduces the probability of working on a 
fixed term arrangement by 25%. However, non-permanent workers looked favourably upon 
the necessity for having strong trade unions.  
The probability of holding a FTC is multiplied by nearly three (2.93) if the employer met an 
unemployment period during the last 5 years. A joblessness episode leads to a decline in the 
future probability to find a permanent job. Unemployment can be perceived as a period of 
human capital desaccumulation. Frequent employment changes are likely to generate a 
depreciation of human capital stock, reducing the specific productivity (Arulampalam, 2001). 
Thus, unemployment provides a negative signal to employers about lower unobservable 
workforce productivity (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). However, according to the assumption of 
stepping stones, temporary employment, less qualified on average, appears as a means of 
                                                 
2
 Part-time workers are those who work less than 30 hours a week; following the OCDE definition 
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generating specific competences to the firm before recruitment on permanent work 
arrangements. 
The autonomy of temporary employees appears relatively reduced. Holding a FTC implies 
low influence on work organization (Daubas-Letourneux, 1998). At the European level, 
temporary workers seem to have less control on the tasks organization, working methods or 
the rhythm of work (Merllié and Paoli, 2001).    
Furthermore, the influence on work organization is weak in the case of fixed term employees 
compared to permanent ones. The use of flexible workers seems to induce a reorganization of 
work while the internal division of work is increased (Goudswaard and Nanteuil, 2000): there 
is a relation between quantitative flexibility and the organisational change. Temporary 
employees appear relatively less involved in functional flexibility. .  
To sum up, the expansion of temporary employment is important for the analysis of labour 
market evolution. It is thus crucial to put forward the determinants of FTC and especially if 
this form of atypical work arrangement leads to a growth in overall employment or whether it 
interact with others forms of employment. 
Accordingly, it is also important to consider which forms of atypical employment are 
available and whether other work arrangements can interact with FTC. A particular focus 
should be given to part time. To answer this question, we also study the similarities and the 
differences between part time and temporary employment.   
 
3.3. Part-time employment and fixed term contract 
As another variety of work flexibility, part-time work concerns directly wage-earners and 
some trade-off between part-time and temporary employment is possible. In this section, these 
two kinds will be compared through bivariate Probit regression.  
Fixed-term contract can be distinguished from part-time by several ways. This latter 
frequently involves citizens of the country. Conversely, immigrants are usually in fixed-term 
employment. Family composition greatly differs between part-time and fixed-term contracts. 
While part-timers are more frequently married, temporary workers generally belong to non-
standard family structures (separated, divorced, widowed or never married). Moreover, fixed-
term workers are less educated. 
Part timers are more involved in overtime work is often whereas temporary workers met more 
frequently unemployment period during the last 5 years. Moreover, part-timers frequently 
work in services sector such as retail trade, education sector, health and personal services.  
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However, some points of convergence characterize the two work arrangements. Women are 
more frequently involved in these two kinds of flexibility even if part-time is more feminized. 
Alternatively, but fixed-term workers are younger than part-timers and domicile location has 
no impact on probability to hold part time or temporary job.  
These two work arrangements are less syndicated and have less hierarchical responsibilities. 
They are more frequently concentrated in small establishments. 
While part-time workers have a higher degree of freedom to organize their own work than 
fixed-term employees, this is less frequent than that of permanent employees. Finally, except 
for Great Britain and Netherlands, these two types of flexibility are generally inverted.  
Given the different effects, a positive correlation coefficient is observed between two forms of 
employment. This result shows a greater probability to cumulate fixed-term contract and part-
time employment in Europe.  
To conclude, the anemic European labour market has led to significant evolution of both offer 
and demand. Accordingly, new forms of work arrangements become recurrent with 
employees working on temporary or part-time schemes. Several experts suggest that the new 
patterns of work will focus on keeping labour costs down through a combination of temporary 
and more part-time jobs. Even if business confidence has improved in recent months, this is 
still fragile and employers remain cautious about adding to their long-term cost base. 
However, a major threat European economies should avoid, that of moving towards a “low-
wage, low-productivity” economy. “More people are working more hours, but productivity is 
less. The labour market is recovering but are we coming out of recession into a new trajectory 
which is a lower-productivity and lower-wage economy than we had before? Are we now 
seeing the effect of years of underinvestment in skills and capital? In such a case, the 
European Union should play a growing role to adjust supply and demand and to streamline 
the labour market 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION: 
In this paper, we analyzed the determinants of FTC in several European countries using the 
European Social Survey. Our results show that temporary employment is conversely 
connected with the age, which supports the idea of stepping stones. In addition, temporary 
workers work less than permanent ones with reference to working time, which reduce their 
potential wages. The probability of holding FTC is negatively correlated with the trade-union 
membership.  
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However, non-permanent workers are more sensitive to the need of strong trade-unions, even 
if temporary employment is associated with weak presence of trade-unions at work. 
Alternatively, past unemployment can be viewed as a period of human capital 
desaccumulation where the probability of holding a FTC is multiplied by almost 3 if the 
employer met an unemployment period during the last 5 years. This also is likely to reduce 
the future probability to find a permanent job. 
Finally, estimates from a bivariate probit show that part time employment is often held by 
native workers while fixed term employment is more devoted to immigrants .However, some 
points of convergence characterize part-time and fixed-term‟ contracts. Women are more 
frequently associated with these two kinds of flexibility. Nonetheless, part-time employment 
is more feminized than fixed-term contract. Age acts in the same sense, but fixed-term 
workers are younger than part-time workers. In the two cases, domicile location has no impact 
on probability to work in part-time or in fixed-term contract 
Comparative analysis thus put forward the determinants of temporary employment, although 
it has been shown that differences between Nordic and southern European countries still 
remains substantial. This suggests that there are both microeconomic and macroeconomic 
factors behind such differences. The proposed models focused on the interaction between the 
institutional framework and the attributes of employers to explain the likelihood of holding a 
temporary or a part time job. However, this analysis should be improved by including a cost 
benefit analysis. It would be interesting to explain why it might be rational for workers to 
renounce to the benefits associated with the investment in specific human capital in exchange 
for temporary jobs. In addition, future research should also focus on dynamic models using 
individual level data, as well as on combined micro and macro-level analysis of the flows 
rather than the stock of temporary work in selected countries.  
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 ANNEXES: 
Table 1: descriptive statistics 
 Permanent 
employment 
Fixed-term 
contracts 
Part in the total paid work  81.5 18.5 
Gender 
  
   Male 49.0 43.2 
   Female  51.0 56.8 
Citizenship  
  
   Citizen of the country 95.6 95.0 
   Immigrant  4.4 5.0 
Age 
  
   15-24 years 5.4 27.9 
   25-34 years 16.8 23.2 
   35-44 years 22.3 17.0 
   45-54 years 19.0 12.4 
   55-65 years 17.1 8.9 
   More than 65 years 19.4 10.6 
Children   
   No child  57.7 66.6 
   One child  17.7 14.4 
   Two children 17.1 12.5 
   Three children or more  7.5 6.5 
Marital status 
  
   Married 59.5 38.2 
   Separated/divorced  9.4 6.9 
   Widowed 7.6 5.2 
  Never married  23.5 49.7 
Domicile description  
  
   Big city  16.4 19.5 
   Suburb or outskirts of big city 17.4 15.3 
   Town or Small city  29.6 30.5 
   Rural area 36.6 34.7 
Highest level of education 
  
   Not completed primary education 2.1 3.7 
   Primary or first stage of basic 10.1 11.2 
   Secondary Education  66.0 64.4 
   Tertiary Education : first stage 15.8 14.4 
   Tertiary Education : second stage 6.0 6.3 
Classification NACE   
   Agriculture, hunting and fishing 2.1 4.5 
   Extractives and manufacturing industries 6.5 5.2 
   Other manufacturing industries 10.1 6.3 
   Manufacturing of electrical and transport equipments 4.8 3.5 
   Construction and Electricity supply 7.5 7.3 
   Trade, hotels and restaurants 15.7 18.7 
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   Transport and financial intermediation 10.4 6.6 
   Real Estate, public administration 16.1 14.6 
   Education, Health and social work 20.3 22.9 
   Social, personal services and household activities 6.5 10.4 
Part time 16.2 24.9 
Membership of trade-union or similar  32.6 21.7 
Trade-union at the work place  61.3 53.9 
The need of strong trade-unions 
  
  Absolutely agree  28.9 32.6 
  Agree  47.0 47.7 
  Neither agree, nor disagree 13.1 12.3 
  Disagree 9.1 6.1 
  Absolutely disagree  1.9 1.3 
Unemployment Period during the last 5 years 8.9 26.2 
The establishment size  
  
   < 10  24.3 33.0 
  [10 , 24 ] 18.0 22.1 
   [25, 99 ] 23.6 21.2 
   [100, 499 ] 18.7 13.6 
   > 500 15.4 10.1 
to what extent organize own work 
  
   Not at all 12.7 18.9 
   Very little 12.3 16.8 
   To some extent 26.0 27.8 
   To a large extent 49.0 36.5 
Allowed to decide how the daily work is organized 
  
  No influence 8.3 15.8 
  Weak influence 13.1 18.8 
  certain influence  37.5 34.8 
  Strong influence 41.1 30.6 
Total 23,279 5,419 
 
 
Table 2 Socio demographic determinants of fixed term contracts 
Fixed term contract Probit 
 Coefficients t-test 
   Constant 1.633  11.34*** 
   Gender female 0.123    5.68*** 
   Age 
-0.069 -18.40*** 
   Age square (/100) 0.052  13.91*** 
   Citizen of the country 
-0.129   -2.20** 
   Born in the country  
-0.094   -2.37** 
   Household size 0.052    4.90*** 
Marital status 
  
   Married Ref.  
   Separated/divorced  0.165    4.36*** 
   Widowed 0.124    2.59*** 
   Never married  0.224    7.36*** 
Children   
   No child  Ref.  
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   One child  
-0.115   -3.72*** 
   Two children 
-0.182   -4.86*** 
   Three children or more  
-0.170   -3.19*** 
Highest level of education 
  
   Not completed primary education Ref.  
   Primary or first stage of basic 
-0.238   -3.64*** 
   Secondary Education  
-0.399   -6.32*** 
   Tertiary Education : first stage 
-0.480   -7.08*** 
   Tertiary Education : second stage 
-0.345   -4.59*** 
Classification NACE   
   Agriculture, hunting and fishing Ref.  
   Extractives and manufacturing industries -0.519   -7.58*** 
   Other manufacturing industries -0.634   -9.56*** 
   Manufacturing of electrical and transport 
equipments -0.567   -7.61*** 
   Construction and Electricity supply -0.453   -6.79*** 
   Trade, hotels and restaurants -0.490   -7.97*** 
   Transport and financial intermediation -0.607   -9.17*** 
   Real Estate, public administration -0.455   -7.32*** 
   Education, Health and social work -0.272   -4.45*** 
   Social, personal services and household 
activities -0.155   -2.36** 
Domicile description  
  
   Big city  Ref.  
   Suburb or outskirts of big city 
-0.022   -0.64 
   Town or Small city  0.033    1.08 
   Rural area 0.008    0.27 
Countries   
   Austria 
-0.116   -1.88* 
   Belgium  
-0.115   -1.73* 
   Switzerland  
-0.205   -3.25*** 
   Germany  
-0.003   -0.06 
   Denmark Ref.  
   Spain 0.598    9.41*** 
   Finland  0.377    6.60*** 
   France 0.318    4.68*** 
   Great Britain  
-0.014   -0.23 
   Greece  0.261    4.02*** 
   Ireland  0.225    3.65*** 
   Island  0.342    5.40*** 
   Italy  0.117    1.52 
   Luxembourg 
-0.363   -4.56*** 
   Netherlands  
-0.027   -0.45 
   Norway  
-0.046   -0.77 
   Portugal  0.210    3.12*** 
   Sweden  0.149    2.53** 
   Slovenia  0.240    3.70*** 
Number of observations 
Number of Fixed-term contract 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
25354 
4874 
  -10518.775 
 0.1315 
The reported coefficients are estimated from a probit model. The population selected is all wage-earners over 15 
years of age. The significance levels are respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
Source: ESS 2002-2003 
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Table 2a: the determinants of temporary employment by country 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
 AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR UK GR IRL ISL ITL LUX NL NOR PT SWD SLV 
FTC 228 183 182 325 201 363 462 219 233 239 289 337 122 120 268 260 227 380 236 
Observation 1626 1209 1581 2270 1285 984 1685 826 1696 1045 1237 1112 633 798 1854 1680 999 1724 1096 
Log Likelihood  -552 -372 -471 -788 -496 -479 -719 -387 -632 -490 -625 -605 -234 -209 -666 -595 -425 -697 -462 
Constant    --  +   --- ---  --  --     - 
Gender : female  +++    +++ +   +++   +++ + +++ ++ ++ +++  
Citizenship  --    --- ---  --  ---    ---  -   
Household size  +++ +++ +     ++ +   +     ++  
Age 
                   
15-24 years +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ +++ ++ +++  + +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
25-34 years  +++   ++ +++ +++   +++  +++   +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
35-44 years      +    +++  +++  +++ +++ +++ +   
45-54 years  ++     +   ++  +++     ++ + ++ 
55-64 years Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
65 and more     ---                
Marital status                    
Married Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Separated    ++   + +++     ++     +++  
Widowed +++  +++     ++            
Never married +++ + +++ +++  + +++ ++     +++    +++ +++ +++ 
children                    
Without  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
1 child  --                  
2 children                --    
3 and more  --- --         - -       
Level of 
education                     
Not completed  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Primary  
     ---       ++     --  
Secondary  
---  ---   --- -   ---        - - 
Tertiary : 1st   
  --  - --- --   --       + - --- 
Tertiary : 2nd  
---  -               - - 
Nace                    
Nace0 Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Nace 1 
    --- ---   -    ---   -- --- --  
Nace 2 
 --  -- -- ---  -     ---   --- --- ---  
Nace 3 
 -  ---  ---   -    ---   -- --- ---  
Nace 4 
 --    ---       ---   - --- ---  
Nace 5 
 --  -- --- ---       --  - --- --- -  
Nace 6 
 --  --- -- ---  --     ---   -- --- ---  
Nace 7 
 -  --  ---       ---   - --- --- - 
Nace 8 
     --- +++      ---    --- --  
Nace 9 
 -    --- ++      --    --   
Domicile 
description                    
Big city  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Suburb  
  --               ---  
Town  
  ---         +++     -   
Rural area 
  ---   +   --        -   
 
The reported coefficients are estimated from a probit model. The population selected is all wage-earners over 15 
years of age. The significance levels are respectively equal to 1% (+++/---), 5% (++/--) and 10% (+/-).  
The white cells correspond to non-significant variables.  
Source: ESS 2002-2003 
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Table 3 Fixed term contract and work conditions 
Fixed term contract Probit 
 Coefficients t-test 
   Constant -0.308   -3.25*** 
   Hierarchical responsibility -0.240   -9.37*** 
   Working time (in hours) -0.005   -5.89*** 
   Formation -0.072   -3.02*** 
   Unemployed during the last 5 years 0.544   19.41*** 
   Trade-union membership -0.245 -10.17*** 
The establishment size  
  
   < 10  0.013    0.43 
  [10 , 24 ] Réf.  
   [25, 99 ] 
-0.119   -3.80*** 
   [100, 499 ] 
-0.166   -4.77*** 
   > 500 
-0.174   -4.60*** 
to what extent organize own work 
  
   To a large extent 
-0.258   -7.93*** 
   To some extent  
-0.194   -6.22*** 
   Very little Réf.  
   not at all 0.182   4.48*** 
Number of observations 
Number of FTCs 
LoG Likelihood  
Pseudo R2 
23211 
4522 
-9528.236 
0.1378 
The reported coefficients are estimated from a probit model. The population selected is all wage-earners over 15 
years of age. The significance levels are respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
Age, gender and the years of schooling are included in this regression. Binary variables for each country are also 
specified. 
Source: ESS 2002-2003 
Table 4 Part-time employment and fixed term contract 
Variables Part-time employment Fixed term contract 
 Coefficients t-test Coefficients t-test 
   Constant -0.608   -3.36*** 1.145    7.04*** 
   Sex (female) 0.645   25.44*** 0.039    1.64* 
   Age -0.027   -6.13*** -0.069 -16.51*** 
   Age square (/100) 0.023    5.19*** 0.056   13.33*** 
   Citizen of the country 0.256    4.30*** -0.118   -2.22** 
   Household size 0.069    5.25*** 0.056    4.84*** 
Marital status 
    
   Married Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  
   Separated/divorced  
-0.138   -3.38*** 0.105    2.56** 
   widowed 
-0.085   -1.65* 0.066    1.25 
   Never married  
-0.172   -4.78*** 0.175    5.30*** 
Children     
   No child  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  
   One child  
-0.019   -0.56 -0.128   -3.83*** 
   Two children 
-0.005   -0.12 -0.184   -4.54*** 
   Three children or more  
-0.082   -1.37 -0.172   -2.98*** 
Highest level of education 
    
   Not completed primary education Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  
   Primary or first stage of basic 
-0.011   -0.11 -0.238   -3.12*** 
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   Secondary Education  
-0.116   -1.32 -0.277   -3.77*** 
   Tertiary Education : first stage 
-0.123   -1.33 -0.248   -3.16*** 
   Tertiary Education : second stage 
-0.131   -1.31 -0.115   -1.33 
Classification NACE     
   Agriculture, hunting and fishing Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  
   Extractives and manufacturing industries -0.348   -3.65*** -0.448   -5.70*** 
   Other manufacturing industries -0.299   -3.27*** -0.524   -6.93*** 
   Manufacturing of electrical and transport 
equipments -0.240   -2.35** -0.496   -5.89*** 
   Construction and Electricity supply -0.324   -3.38*** -0.392   -5.15*** 
   Trade, hotels and restaurants 0.253    3.13*** -0.443   -6.30*** 
   Transport and financial intermediation 0.007    0.08 -0.496   -6.56*** 
   Real Estate, public administration 0.045    0.54 -0.318   -4.47*** 
   Education, Health and social work 0.601    7.45*** -0.135   -1.92* 
   Social, personal services and household 
activities 0.411    4.86*** -0.100   -1.34 
Domicile description  
    
   Big city  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  
   Suburb or outskirts of big city 0.041    1.05 0.009    0.23 
   Town or Small city  0.004    0.11 0.030    0.90 
   Rural area 
-0.024   -0.68 0.006    0.17 
   Additional time 0.009    8.97*** -0.002   -1.52 
   Unemployed during the last 5 years 0.049    1.45 0.615   21.16*** 
   Trade-union membership 
-0.167   -6.49*** -0.150   -5.94*** 
   Hierarchical responsibility 
-0.475 -17.56*** -0.220   -8.44*** 
The establishment size  
    
   < 10  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  
  [10 , 24 ] 
-0.198   -6.21*** 0.020    0.65 
   [25, 99 ] 
-0.212   -6.81*** -0.086   -2.77*** 
   [100, 499 ] 
-0.335   -9.28*** -0.101   -2.88*** 
   > 500 
-0.473   -11.24*** -0.101   -2.58** 
to what extent organize own work 
    
   To a large extent Ref  Ref Ref  Ref  
   To some extent  
-0.030   -1.18 0.032    1.26 
   Very little 0.064    1.84* 0.236    7.11*** 
   not at all 
-0.028   -0.65 0.381    9.70*** 
Countries     
   Austria Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  
   Belgium  0.060    0.92 0.014    0.20 
   Switzerland  0.104    1.78* -0.022   -0.34 
   Germany  
-0.036   -0.65 0.052    0.87 
   Denmark 
-0.085   -1.33 0.175    2.61*** 
   Spain 
-0.578   -7.17*** 0.516    7.36*** 
   Finland  
-0.514   -7.98*** 0.555    9.14*** 
   France 
-0.321   -4.18*** 0.335    4.68*** 
   Great Britain  0.246    4.32*** 0.127    2.03** 
   Greece  
-0.730   -9.43*** 0.280    4.12*** 
   Ireland  0.007    0.11 0.407    6.31*** 
   Island  0.019    0.29 0.462    6.88*** 
   Italy  
-0.298   -3.43*** 0.073    0.85 
   Luxembourg 
-0.137   -1.71* -0.258   -2.93*** 
   Netherlands  0.461    8.38*** 0.167    2.70*** 
   Norway  
-0.028   -0.47 0.137    2.18** 
   Portugal  
-0.876   -10.16*** 0.265    3.62*** 
   Sweden  
-0.234   -3.76*** 0.281    4.49*** 
24 
 
   Slovenia  
-0.957   -10.41*** 0.371    5.44*** 
Number of part-time workers 5181  
Number of fixed-time contract workers  4522 
Nombre of observation 
Corrélation coefficient (t-test) 
Log likelihood 
23211 
0.126*** (7,67) 
-17496.846 
The reported coefficients are estimated from a bivariate probit model. The population selected is all wage-
earners over 15 years of age. The significance levels are respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
Age, gender and the years of schooling are included in this regression. Binary variables for each country are also 
specified. 
Source: ESS 2002-2003 
 
 
 
